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Abstract 
Public sector organisations in developing countries are in immense pressure to deliver 
citizen-centric services. While corruption is well recognised as a critical obstruction for 
progress, it is not well understood. This paper consists of a revelatory case study aimed 
to explore and conceptualise how corruption takes place and what factors contribute to 
control corruption. It explains how corruption emerges as ‘parasitic process ecosystems’, 
innate and cultivated due to inefficiencies in the main processes, and how IT-enabled 
process transformations can alleviate the existence and impact of such parasitic 
processes. The process ecosystem perspective used here to conceptualise corruption is 
novel. Derived from the case evidence and supported by existing theories, a conceptual 
model of corruption control is presented. Insights extrapolated from the case study are 
presented as useful normative guidelines for practice. Future research to further build on 
the outcomes of this exploratory study is proposed. 
Keywords: Developing country, Public sector, Corruption, Process eco-systems, 
Transformations, Parasitic processes. 
Introduction 
Public sector organisations are continuously under pressure to improve their performance in order to 
provide effective services (Jurisch et al. 2013). This pressure is high and constantly increasing in developing 
nations, with funding and other socio-economic challenges (Hope 2013). Government departments in 
developing countries are increasingly embarking on e-Government initiatives with a strong focus on 
Business Process Improvement (BPI) and Information Technology (IT) to achieve enhanced service 
delivery (Rajapakse et al. 2012). However, a high failure rate of these e-Government initiatives 
(approximately 85% in developing countries) has been reported (Dada 2006; Heeks 2003; Hunter 2009). 
While these high failure rates are attributed to inefficient bureaucratic processes, legacy technological 
infrastructure, limited resources (financial and human), socio-political and cultural environment 
compatibility, and poor performance measurement etc. (Ahmed and Gregor 2007; Nguyen and Schauder 
2007), they also suffer greatly from prevalent corruption  (Gulledge and Sommer 2002). 
Corruption is the exercise of official powers against the public interest or the abuse of public office for 
private gains (Shah 2006). The corruption syndrome is high in developing countries and is reported as a 
key reason for e-Government failure (Dada 2006; Olken and Pande 2012). The World Bank (2018) 
highlights the negative impact of corruption, describing how it is a major barrier to eliminate poverty. 
Corruption causes service inefficiency, increases cost of public services, creates convoluted processes, and 
allows officials to embezzle funds and create channels for bribes (Olken and Pande 2012). It is a global 
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phenomenon, with more than 2/3 of countries suffering with moderate to high corruption (Transparency 
International 2019). Corruption warrants attention and deeper conceptualisation in order to form 
mechanisms for better control.  
Combining Information technology (IT) and Business Process Improvement (BPI) have been considered as 
one of the solutions that can bring transparency to address the chronic issue of corruption (Bertot et al. 
2010). The IT in the form of e-Government has been used by various developing and developed 
governments to improve citizen access to public services and process efficiencies (Kim 2014). Corruption is 
identified as one of the key reasons for e-Government failure in developing countries (Aladwani 2016). The 
research in the selected domain is primarily focused on the IT aspect with limited explanation of the role of 
processes. Based on our observations, we suggest addressing the identified research gap and exploring the 
relationship between IT and processes. 
This paper consists of a revelatory exploratory case study aimed to answer the question, “How can public 
sector organisations control corruption using IT-enabled process improvement?” In the next sections, we 
first present the applied case study approach and introduce the case. We then present the observations in 
the form of a case narrative, which forms the evidence-base to the proposed conceptualisation, which is also 
further supported with eminent theories (as sense-making devises). We conclude the paper with a summary 
discussion and suggested propositions for future investigations. 
Case Study Methodology and Introducing the Case Study 
We followed a single in-depth case approach for this paper. Single case studies are known to provide rich 
insights and be well-suited for exploring a novel and revelatory phenomena (Lee 1989; Yin 2009). The 
findings are based on a unique transformative initiative that occurred at the Department of Motor Traffic 
(DMT), in the Western Province of Sri Lanka. The DMT is a case that initially suffered from deeply rooted 
corruption, which was put under control through a number of innovative IT-enabled process 
transformations that took place in an iterative manner, making it a rich case. Interviews and document 
analysis were used to collect the research data. Interviewees were identified using  Noy (2008)’s 
snowballing approach during the case exploration and consisted of key personnel from the DMT and ICTA 
who were involved in the transformation activities. A few citizens were also approached during the data 
collection process. Details of the interview participants are provided in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interviews were open-ended, extrapolating the interviewees’ perspectives of the pre- and post-
transformation conditions and outcomes. A range of official documents (inter-organisation reports, process 
and system studies, solution designs, as well as reports publically published by the ICTA and DMT) were 
collected and analysed to augment observations from the interviews. Interview data was transcribed, 
verbatim coded, and analysed using NVivo (a qualitative data analysis software). The data was analysed 
iteratively using Dubois and Gadde (2014)’s systematic combining approach where key factors that helped 
to control corruption were inductively identified and analysed (with further insights from literature) to form 
the conceptualisation of IT-enabled process ecosystems to control corruption.  
Table 1. Interview Participant Profiles 
Participant Assigned Code Role Duration  
Commissioner-DMT CM-DMT Transformation  Leader 3 x 90 min 
Director-DMT DR-DMT Internal Stakeholder 1 x 60 min 
Finance Officer FO Team Member 1 x 90 min 
Counter Clerk C-Staff Internal Stakeholder 1 x 60 min 
IT Manager IT-Staff Team Member  1 x 90 min 
ICTA Programme Manager ICTA-PgM Programme Manager 1 x 90 min 
ICTA Project Manager ICTA-PM Project Manager 1 x 60 min 
Citizens (x 2) Citizen #1, #2  End User 2 x 30 min 
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The DMT issues and renews vehicle revenue licenses (a receipt of road tax) in Sri Lanka. As of April 2019, 
there are 7,727,411 registered vehicles in Sri Lanka, out of which the Western Province constitutes 
approximately 30% of the registered vehicles (MoTCA 2019). The department issues approximately 1.2 
million vehicle revenue licenses annually (Bhatti et al. 2014), with a total earning of 10.6 billion Sri Lankan 
Rupees (US$ 93 million) in the year 2017 through the taxes and levies on vehicles (MoTCA 2017; MoTCA 
2019). 
The transformation efforts were originally initiated in 2003 by the DMT staff to overcome the paper-based 
and inefficient processes to improve the service requirements of the citizens. Multiple initial attempts were 
unsuccessful and consequently in 2006, the e-Revenue Licence (e-RL) project was conceptualised and 
implemented by the DMT and the Information Communication Technology Agency (ICTA). ICTA is Sri 
Lanka’s apex government agency that leads public sector BPI and IT-enabled transformation. Initially, a 
client-server based system to digitally print the license was implemented at the DMT head office and later, 
extended to its 29 branches in the Western Province. Next, in 2008, an innovative “On the Wheel” revenue 
license process was introduced to further improve service delivery. The next improvement was in 2015 when 
an online e-Revenue License service (eRL) was launched to improve the citizen access and the efficiency of 
licensing services. These initiatives were designed to fully automate the revenue license issuing process 
using centralised databases to facilitate renewals. Though it was not the prime focus, these changes enabled 
the DMT to contain corruption by facilitating the process efficiency, sustainability, and ease of service 
access to the citizens. 
Case Narrative and Emerging Findings  
In the case of the DMT, corruption emerged due to inherent process inefficiencies fuelled by the prevailing 
socio-political and socio-economic conditions of the country. Prior to the implementation of the e-RL, 
vehicle registrations followed a manual, paper-based process. A citizen was required to physically visit the 
DMT office where the first revenue license was issued. Stepping into the DMT during the work hours of 
9am to 3pm was chaotic. Queues of people lined up to renew their revenue licenses; with many complaining 
of delays and inefficiencies for their service requirements. The process, in most cases, took two days to 
complete.  Staff were over-burdened with trivial clerical work, which resulted in other important work being 
delayed. Citizens were sent to several service counters to complete their work. A citizen had to stand in three 
separate queues for verification of documents, for payment, and finally, for issuing of the license to complete 
the process. Furthermore, different vehicle classes had dedicated counters. A customer who wished to 
obtain licenses for different vehicle classes had to approach the separate counters to complete the process 
for each class of vehicle, resulting in much longer waiting periods.  
These conditions provided opportunities for local area residents belonging to the low social-income class to 
act as ‘brokers’ to assist citizens by offering their services as workarounds (i.e. standing in queue, 
photocopying documents, and filling forms etc.) for a mutually agreed fee. These brokers recognised the 
citizens’ reluctance to spend time and effort as an economic ‘opportunity’, and collaborated with few 
internal staff in exchange for shared financial incentives, leading to the emergence of corruption (in the 
form of bribes). Brokers also started to print out forged revenue licenses and were issuing the documents 
to the citizens for a fee, causing significant losses to the government (in the form of road tax); “A parallel 
system (unofficial) existed outside the DMT office that was operated by many brokers. They were running 
their business using the opportunity that currently existed due to the inefficient situation in the office” 
(CM-DMT). These forged licenses were quite a lucrative source of income for the brokers. At the same time, 
because these brokers were stationed in very close proximity to the DMT premises, citizens wrongly 
assumed that their licenses were original. The only time a citizen realised their mistake was when they came 
back the next year to renew their licenses and received penalty charges for deferred renewal; “Upon 
receiving the payment from a citizen to provide their services, the brokers came into the office, and got 
counterfeit licenses made for the citizen instead of the original license” (CM-DMT). Apart from inefficient 
processes and long waiting times, citizens were also concerned with the deteriorating security situation of 
the country. Sri Lanka was facing a civil war, and terrorist attacks on government offices were common. 
The fear for their safety acted as an enabler and motivated the citizens to spend less time at DMT by getting 
their revenue licenses using brokers. The brokers recognised this opportunity and created various methods 
to maximise their income; “One of the reasons behind the corruption was the terrorist activities in the 
country in that era. The government offices were potential targets for the terrorists and people were 
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concerned about their own safety. These concerns made citizens tolerant of the brokers' fraudulent 
activities to save time and reduce risks” (CM-DMT). 
In 2006, a new head of department (the Commissioner) joined DMT. He immediately recognised the severe 
inefficiencies and citizen problems. As the first step, he did walkthroughs of every citizen-serving process 
to understand the ground realities; “For three months I examined the office to understand the issues behind 
high process inefficiencies and the prevalent corruption; I also joined the queues along with the citizens 
to understand the problems the citizens faced when they came to the office to pay their dues to the 
Government” (CM-DMT). The efforts resulted in a clear understanding that the critical issues were related 
to extremely inefficient processes. As the next step, the Commissioner identified a few staff members who 
also shared his vision, and had the passion to improve the situation. Organisational culture and inter-
departmental coordination were also contributing to the inefficiencies. Initial efforts to streamline the 
processes were met with stiff resistance from certain staff at different levels who were engaged in corrupt 
practices. They feared that process improvement efforts would result in financial losses; “they used to earn 
plenty of commissions (in the form of bribes); by evening they used to have enough money to lavishly 
spend in hotels and restaurants” (FO). The transformation proposals were also blocked by the 
administrative and bureaucratic barriers; “we came across resistance from red tape and bureaucratic rules 
and regulations and the officers (Staff) of the department who had benefitted by this situation” (CM-DMT). 
These internal issues further benefited the brokers.  
However, as a result of the Commissioner’s persistent personal efforts and appeals to higher authorities, an 
approval to initiate the process reforms as a pilot project with limited resources was received from the Chief 
Minister of the Western Province. The digitally-printed license format was introduced to replace the manual 
pre-printed license books. Multi-purpose one-stop service counters were created for citizens to renew any 
class of vehicle license. A custom-built IT system was implemented to record license details in a centralised 
database. Counter staff were empowered to authorise documents as well as issue new licenses. To motivate 
the staff, a commission-based financial incentive scheme was also introduced. As a result, the process cycle 
time was reduced to 5 minutes from 2 hours, and brokers were unable to forge the licenses anymore.  
The main office issues 1,200 licenses each day, with an approximate number of 200,000 licenses annually. 
The redesigned and improved processes and IT system brought about a major paradigm shift within the 
staff. Staff were able to work more productively, and were also happy in their empowered roles. However, 
the brokers were still able to contact their counterpart staff and entice them to expedite the process for their 
clients by offering financial incentives. To contain the corruption, the Commissioner introduced directives 
to restrict the brokers entering the office and communicate with the staff; “I made a rule that the officers 
could not issue licenses to the brokers, and the brokers could not come inside the office and contact the 
officers for any reason” (CM-DMT). This step created a number of issues for the DMT staff. The brokers’ 
network reacted, as the Commissioner’s decision severely affected their economic well-being. A delegation 
of brokers met the Commissioner to complain; “A brokers’ delegation visited me and mentioned the 
negative effects on their livelihood and income, that they were poor people and had children to look after. 
They offered to carry on their service and solicit with people and requested permission to come inside the 
DMT office only to submit the application form and to deliver the renewed license to the citizen once the 
process is complete” (CM-DMT).  
The Commissioner was well aware of the brokers’ socio-economic issues. To create a win-win situation, the 
brokers were allowed to provide services with some level of legitimacy by introducing a ‘registered broker 
model’ to allow their entry into the office and also to charge a reasonable amount from the citizen who opted 
to get broker-services. However, the citizens preferred getting the services directly from the office due to 
improved efficiency of formal processes. The brokers’ network reacted violently and resorted to creating 
new concerns for citizens. Citizens were worried about the safety of their vehicles parked outside while they 
obtained their licenses. People were being swarmed by brokers who constantly patrolled the car park to 
extort money from citizens in return for procuring the revenue license. Once a citizen file was taken over by 
a broker, legal actions could not be taken against the brokers, as the citizen’s presence to obtain the revenue 
license was not mandatory. Furthermore, staff who refused to collaborate with brokers were receiving 
threats, putting them under constant pressure; “Citizens who had refused the broker services started 
complaining about their vehicles getting damaged and parts being stolen. The broker gangs had started 
to charge extortion money from citizens who parked their vehicles and started causing damage and 
stealing parts of those who refused to pay the money. There were threats to the officers from the ‘thugs’ 
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who were running their illegal operations outside of the DMT office. So I had to contact the police and got 
their involvement whereby there were a few thug arrests by the police” (CM-DMT). 
This critical situation and concern for the staff and citizens’ wellbeing motivated the Commissioner and his 
team to think outside the box and launched one of the most innovative ideas in the Sri Lankan public sector. 
In keeping up with the latest technology and process-benchmarking against McDonald’s for customer 
service, the DMT implemented a swift “Revenue License On-the-Wheel” process. This is a drive-through 
system where the motorists could obtain their revenue license in two minutes by simply handing over the 
completed documents to a special counter while seated in their vehicle. The main objective of the drive-
through license process was to prevent the involvement of third-party brokers in obtaining revenue licenses. 
Furthermore, it also addressed the safety concerns of the citizens. “Revenue License On-the-Wheel” was 
made available at the main office in Colombo, which handles the bulk of the transactions in order to serve 
the public more effectively. Around 80 to 300 licenses per day are renewed using this process.  
In a bid to effectively manage the service demand, the Commissioner contacted the Secretary of Public 
Administration to gain approval for increased service time from 8.45 am to 4.00 pm, instead of the usual 
9.00am to 3.00pm followed by all public sector offices in Sri Lanka. This enabled the DMT to provide their 
services at more convenient hours to the public. As a result, there was a drastic improvement in service 
delivery and containment of corruption. The brokers were unable to find much opportunity to interfere with 
the new processes and IT systems introduced by the DMT; “As an outcome of these steps, day by day, the 
number of brokers started to come down” (C-Staff).  
The technology-enabled process innovations continued at the Department. As a final solution, an Online 
Revenue License System was implemented by ICTA in consultation with DMT staff. The system allowed 
citizens to apply and pay for the required license without visiting the DMT offices. The introduction of the 
online service resulted in complete elimination of the brokers’ illegal network by blocking their interference 
with the staff and operations. The success of the DMT was immense, leading to many other departments 
following suit. Today, all DMT branches in the Western Province run the new system. This is also the only 
province that dramatically cut costs by redesigning the digital revenue license template. 
Summary Discussion  
We observed key factors that create opportunities for corruption in our analysis. The inefficient processes, 
absence of adequate technology, and terrorism concern for citizen safety were the key factors that instigated 
citizens opting for corrupt practices as an alternative option; “So with such barriers in getting efficient 
services from the department, there was a tendency from the general public to do something or give 
something (in forms of bribes) to get things done fast. This led to corrupt practices and lack of integrity 
in the department” (DR-DMT). The salary level in the public sector is generally considered lowly by the 
staff. The economic benefits were the main cause that enticed the staff to collaborate with the brokers. These 
factors provided rich conditions that led to the emergence of close-knit broker-staff coalitions that 
introduced and sustained their workarounds and malpractices, forming a parallel ecosystem. The initial 
efforts to ‘cure’ the corruption were not successful.  
The steps taken to provide a legitimised status to the broker’s network did not produce long-term results 
without addressing the process inefficiency issues. The absence of an attractive financial incentive scheme 
to address the legit economic concerns of staff negatively affected the steps taken to block the brokers’ 
access. The parallel ecosystem responded by adopting different approaches (by extortion and threats to the 
citizens and staff who refused to collaborate with them) to maintain its sustenance. The issue of process 
inefficiency and the resultant corrupt alliances were strongly emphasised in the data; “there was corruption 
and lack of integrity that occurs when systems don’t help the people to get services in an efficient manner; 
it is either because the system makes it difficult leading to corruption, or the system itself is designed to 
be difficult and complicated that results in corruption” (CM-DMT). The case findings also highlight the 
importance of in-depth understanding of socio-economic factors that catalyse the development and 
sustainability of these parallel process ecosystems. The DMT leadership was quite effective in 
identifying the key social issues associated with the brokers’ network; “We also need to understand the 
social background of these people who were acting as brokers around the office. The office was 
surrounded by the people who were resettled in the area from the poor suburbs of Colombo. With limited 
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education and job skills, these communities found brokering an avenue to generate income. And it was a 
very difficult task to get rid of them” (CM-DMT).  
Through our data analysis, we observed that corruption transmutes its form, behaviour, and intensity as an 
outcome of different steps undertaken to curb it. The ultimate solution was a simple yet innovative IT-
enabled process design, and an effective organisational culture change that completely eliminated the 
process loopholes and ceased access to the opportunities for exploitation by the brokers’ alliance. 
While ‘stakeholder analysis’ has been emphasised as a critical factor for process improvement initiatives by 
many, the diverse stakeholder groups that impact these initiatives are often misunderstood (Hailemariam 
and vom Brocke 2010). For effective process improvement, all the different stakeholder groups need to 
work toward the target outcomes as a coalition. Hence, it is important to identify all the groups and their 
needs in process re-design and implementation. In addition to the traditionally acknowledged process 
stakeholders such as employees, service/IT contractors, and customers, this case study illustrates how there 
can be other stakeholders and potential risk elements. For example, the interests of the brokers that created 
the parallel ecosystem had to be appropriately considered in designing processes and IT systems. Not 
understanding their interests and acknowledging their existence would open up opportunities for processes 
and system exploitations. 
The credit of this success story is mainly attributed to the mindfulness, innovative thinking, process-
awareness, and able leadership of the Commissioner; “the key factor is the champion at the department, 
and if it wasn’t for him we wouldn’t have achieved the success” (ICTA-PM). His hands-on ‘lead by example’ 
approach, persistence, and can-do attitude not only motivated the staff of the department, but was well-
appreciated by the citizens and other public sector officers. The steps and strategies adopted by the 
Commissioner provide an excellent example of constraint-based innovation (Agarwal et al. 2016) that is 
especially relevant to resource-scarce government contexts. The case study highlights the importance of 
developing a sustainable process-aware culture in public sector organisations. The details shared provide 
valuable lessons on how process thinking and innovative IT-enabled process design can be used to 
effectively overcome prevailing corrupt practices and resultant parallel process ecosystems. 
A Novel Conceptualisation of Corruption Control 
Organisations are ‘systems’ that utilise people, processes and resources to deliver products and services 
(Robbins et al. 2004). Organisations develop a variety of business processes enabled by information 
technologies with the desire to create efficient, effective and sustainable outcomes. Although no 
organisation will consciously design their processes to be inefficient and under-optimised, due to the 
dynamic nature of organisations and interactions with a number of environmental and contextual factors, 
organisations have to continuously redesign and innovate their processes. In the public sector, these process 
transformations are planned, designed, and implemented within complex networks involving human and 
non-human actors (i.e. Systems) with multiple stakeholders (Syed et al. 2018), requiring ecological thinking 
and organisational ecosystems (Mars et al. 2012).   
In natural sciences, an ecosystem is defined as “an assemblage of organisms and the biotic and abiotic 
environment in which they occur… within an ecosystem, multiple species interact with each other, both 
directly and indirectly, via their shared environment and resources. The structure of the ecosystem and 
the many species interactions within it determine the abundance and dynamics of each species, the flow 
of energy through the system, and ecosystem functions such as stability and productivity” (Rynkiewicz et 
al. 2015, p. 212). Whereas, a process ecosystem is explained by Vidgen and Wang (2006) as a framework 
that incorporates ‘business users, processes, technology, and software’. They describe how mutual 
adaptation takes place between these four components with a complex network of relationships in a process 
ecosystem. They also state that “the business process core ecosystem does not have a hard boundary with 
its environment; rather it will have a close relationship with other systems, entities and stakeholders ... 
with which it will co-evolve” (Vidgen and Wang 2006, p. 264). We position the form and behaviour of the 
brokers’ network and their workaround as parasitic in line with the definition provided by Price (1977, p. 
405) which states that a parasite is “an  organism living in or on another living  organism, obtaining from  
it part or all  of its organic nutriment, commonly  exhibiting some degree of adaptive structural 
modification, and  causing  some  degree  of real  damage  to  its host…parasites are  specialists  in a  host  
environment  with  close co-evolutionary ties.” 
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Inspired by Vidgen and Wang (2006) and Rynkiewicz et al. (2015), we adopted a ‘parasite process 
ecosystem’ view to explain the phenomena observed (Figure 1). We define a ‘parasitic process ecosystem’ 
as the ‘existence of ad-hoc and illegitimate network agents who create workarounds and continually seek 
opportunities to thrive on the inefficiencies and ineffectiveness of a formal process ecosystem’.  
   
(pre-transformation conditions)                          (post-transformation condition) 
Figure 1.  A Conceptual Illustration 
The practices of brokers fit the definition of workarounds which are the variations from standard business 
processes and can affect the performance of an information system (IS) negatively (Alter 2015; Röder et al. 
2014). Essentially, we position corruption as parallel ‘parasitic’ workarounds that thrive off the weaknesses 
(i.e. inefficiencies, lack of governance, lack of conformance) of the formal processes and IT systems. These 
weaknesses enable and create opportunities for parasitic elements to exploit the vulnerabilities of formal 
process ecosystems and to find ways to infuse themselves with the process ecosystems through potential 
access points (i.e. by identifying vulnerable staff and citizens, poorly design processes etc.). These 
interventions to the formal processes are ‘parasitic’ as they ‘drain’ critical essence (i.e. cash flow, integrity, 
quality etc.) and weaken the performance of the formal processes and IS. The case depicted how the 
parasitic elements intervene with the formal process via corrupt agents (i.e. corrupt staff) and gained 
illegitimate access to the formal processes. Inefficient, ineffectively designed, poorly controlled processes, 
and citizen’s at risk acted as easy targets (i.e. opportunities for corrupt practices) that led to the creation of 
workarounds by the parasitic elements as an alternative to offer quick solutions to process users (i.e. the 
citizens) for a financial incentive. Furthermore, the case also depicted how surrounding social and economic 
factors (i.e. poor economic conditions of staff and brokers, political conditions such as vulnerability to 
terrorism, or red tape that blocks positive changes) also play a key role that fertilises corruption. These 
socio-economic and socio-political factors are common in public sector organisations, especially in 
developing countries, which makes them attractive ‘breeding grounds’ to parasitic ecosystems. Cohen and 
Felson (1979) explained that the key focus for corruption containment should be on guarding the access 
points or the insufficiently protected conditions and targets. Through the case findings, we illustrated how 
corruption transmutes its form and sustains itself if stakeholders develop preventive measures by only using 
either process-improvement activities or managerial controls. We concur that effective control of the 
parasitic elements is possible by an effective and innovative combination of robust organisational change 
supported by top management, well designed IT systems and innovative processes to guard the access 
points to enable the formal process ecosystems to prosper, free from ‘parasitic’ interventions from other 
parallel process ecosystems. Our findings extend the Vidgen and Wang (2006) statement that a process 
ecosystem does not have a hard boundary; we assert that in case of parasitic ecosystems, IT can be 
effectively used as a hard boundary to isolate and shield the formal ecosystems against parasitic ecosystems. 
Furthermore, providing a secure and direct interface to organisational processes through IT systems can 
completely eliminate the citizens’ needs to seek workarounds offered by the parasitic ecosystem leaving 
them in a dormant status.  
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Conclusion 
The study provides a novel, theoretically grounded, and empirically supported explanation on how 
corruption occurs and how it can be managed. Using a rich case from a developing country public sector 
context, this paper describes corruption as parallel ‘parasitic’ process ecosystems. These parasitic process 
ecosystems emerge due to opportunities created by inefficiencies of formal processes and are further fueled 
by socio-political and socio-economic conditions. Once formed, these parasitic process ecosystems are 
resilient; continuously transmuting to counteract restraining mechanisms. Findings depict how parasitic 
process ecosystems can be better contained by the effective use of IT-enabled process transformations to 
reduce the opportunities by guarding the access points. The case also pointed to the critical role that 
effective change management and leadership played in ‘making things happen’.  
The paper points to a number of normative guidelines for transformation champions (especially in contexts 
prone to corruption, such as developing country public sectors) to consider. A shift from a simple process 
view to a process ecosystem’s view is highlighted, and the need to analyse the situation beyond the 
traditional boundaries of processes and systems is denoted. This also means that stakeholder analysis for 
IT-enabled transformations should hold a broader perspective to include potential parasitic ecosystems. 
Methods of process analysis and design should be deployed to identify and manage potential access points 
that parasitic processes can use to intervene with the formal processes. Innovative IT systems supporting 
the business processes can act as the citizen interface by guarding all potential process vulnerabilities. Thus, 
the design, deployment and continuous maintenance of IT systems should incorporate effective controls to 
quell parasites.  
The insights of this exploratory case study can be developed with further research. A more comprehensive 
conceptualisation of parasitic process ecosystems, with an enhanced definition, multiple examples and a 
typology of parasitic process ecosystems will be helpful. Given that access points facilitate the coevolution 
of parasitic workarounds, further research is needed to systematically identify the attribute of ‘access’ points 
and their vulnerability factors. Furthermore, studying how parasitic ecosystems evolve, transmute and 
create workarounds, and the rate at which these workarounds transmute in response to controlling 
interventions could present novel insights useful for process innovations.  
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